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MADISON'S THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
By EDWARD M. BURNS*
The recent tendency of the Supreme Court to make vigor-
ous assertion of its powers in the face of New Deal legislation
has again brought to the fore the question of the origin of ju-
dicial review. Did the founding fathers intend that this pre-
rogative should be exercised by the judiciary, or has the highest
court in the land simply usurped a power of life and death over
legislation enacted by the representatives of the people?
Curious reactions anent this question were produced by the de-
cision of the Court in the Schechter case1 last May. Senator
Borah, in a radio address soon afterward, upheld the decision
as a confirmation of the doctrine of Madison, Jefferson, and
Washington that the Constitution of the United States estab-
lishes a limited government, and that it is the duty of the Court
to enforce those limitations. But the following day General
Hugh S. Johnson condemned the decision and just as emphat-
ically avowed himself on the side of Madison, Jefferson, and
Washington.
As everyone knows the Constitution of the United States
makes no express grant of a judicial power to annul legislation.
Moreover, no proposition to confer such a power was ever sub-
mitted to the Federal Convention of 1787. Yet there can be no
reasonable doubt that Madison and the majority of his more
prominent colleagues in that convention had definite convictions
in favor of the principle of judicial review. 2 Proof of this state-
ment can be found in the seventeenth century theory of law
which all of these men accepted, and in various declarations
which they made from time to time in speeches and writings.
I
American legal theory in colonial times represented an accu-
mulation of ideas that ran all the way back to Cicero and the
* Member of the faculty of Rutgers University; A. B., 1925, Ph. D.,
1935, University of Pittsburgh. Author of The Political Philosophy of
James Madisoi4 University of Pittsburgh Bulletin, vol. 32, no. 1.
Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55
Sup. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1935).
2See Charles A. Beard, The Supreme Court and the Constitution,
New York, 1922, pp. 17-18.
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Stoics, and included the contributions of the Mledievalists, of
Braeton, of Coke, and most of all of Locke. Cicero and the
Stoics furnished the idea of a law of nature, the embodiment of
justice, universal, constant, and eternal. Medievalists, like John
of Salisbury, contributed the doctrine of authority as intrinsi-
cally conditioned or limited by its very nature. Bracton and
Coke evolved the conception of the common law as the primary
expression of right reason, of the higher law, and therefore as a
limitation upon the powers of King and Parliament. Locke
was preeminently responsible for setting up the substantive
rights of the individual as an automatic restraint upon the
powers of government. But all of these limitations were in per-
fect accordance with a single main tradition, that is, the tradi-
tion of a higher law of universal right, eternal reason, and ab-
stract justice, which is superior to all ordinary statutes and
decrees.
3
As a result of these different influences American lawyers
and philosophers in the latter half of the eighteenth century
had adopted a view of law that was quite different from the
modern conception. They did not think of law in the positivist
sense of the command of a superior addressed to an inferior, but
mainly as the expression of eternal principles of right and reason,
self-evident to the minds of all enlightened men. Of course
they did not regard statutes and decrees as examples of law in
this sense; they conceived of them merely as governmental acts,
subject to the limitations of the higher law. They did gradually
adopt the idea, however, that a written constitution was a prime
example of the higher law; and while of course they did not
take it to include the whole body of that law, they nevertheless
believed that it derived its main validity from the fact of its
content, from the fact that it incorporated within itself princi-
ples of intrinsic sanctity.
4
The doctrine of judicial review was a direct outgrowth, of
the theory of law that has just been described. Since the belief
prevailed that there were sacred principles of universal right
which acted as limitations upon all authority, and since ordi-
nary statutes were regarded as mere experiences of the will of
3Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American
Constitutional Law (1928-29), 42 Harv. L. Rev. 149, 157, 172-85, 393.
4A. C. McLaughlin, The Foundation of American Constitution-
alism, New York, 1932, pp. 107 ff.
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governing agents, it was perhaps almost inevitable that some
system should be developed whereby conflicts between the higher
law and the inferior enactments could be settled in favor of the
former. This system did not necessarily have to take the form
of review of legislation by the courts; it might have conformed
to the English pattern of making the legislative body the
supreme judge of the validity of its own enactments. There
were several reasons, however, that precluded the latter develop-
ment. In the first place the American legislatures were not ju-
dicial bodies, whereas Parliament under late medieval theory did
have the status of a "high court". Besides, the legislatures
in this country, by reason of their interferences with private
rights, had brought themselves into disrepute with the ruling
classes, and a means of curbing their power was ardently de-
sired.
Probably the most important of all the reasons, however,
was the long series of precedents for judicial review that had
been established in England and America in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. The first of these precedents was Coke's
famous decision in Dr. Bonham's Case6 in 1610. The renowned
chief justice ruled in this case that the common law would con-
trol and adjudge "utterly void" an act of Parliament against
common right or reason, or impossible of performance. In
America as early as 1657 a Massachusetts court in the case of
Giddings v. Brown7 set aside an act of a town meeting on the
ground that it conflicted with the law of nature.8 The most
numerous and the most significant precedents on this side of the
Atlantic, however, were established in the second half of the
eighteenth century. The conflict between the colonies and the
moth.er country gave rise to frequent attacks upon the power of
Parliament, and the same basis of an appeal to a higher law
characterized nearly all of them. John Adams, for an example,
in denouncing the Stamp Act, declared: "It is utterly void
and of no binding force upon us; for it is against our rights as
men and our privileges as Englishmen. . . Parliaments may
5 Of. C. H. MeIlwain, The High Court of Parliament, New Haven,
1910.
6 8 Co. Rep. 114a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610).
72 Hutchinson Papers (Prince Soc. 1865), 1-15.
s Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review (1926), 40 Harv.
L. Rev. 30, 61-62.
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err, they are not infallible. . . There are certain principles
fixed unalterably in natureY'9
In 1761 James Otis, in the famous Writs of Assistance
Case,10 affirmed the right of an ordinary court to condemn irre-
vocably the enacted will of Parliament in the event of a viola-
tion of the higher law. Soon afterwards American courts began
to act on that principle. A county court in Virginia in 1766 de-
clared the Stamp Act unconstitutional and directed that it need
not be obeyed."1 And on the eve of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, Judge Cushing, later a justice of the United States
Supreme Court, charged a Massachusetts jury to ignore certain
acts of Parliament as "void and inoperative ".12
After independence had been secured the courts continued
the practice of the judicial veto, directed, now, of course, against
the legislatures of the States in their interferences with the
rights of creditors and property owners. Among the examples
of judicial review in this period were the Rhode Island case of
Trevett v. TVeeden,13 the South Carolina case of Bowman v.
Middleton,14 and the North Carolina case of Bayard v. Single-
ton.-5 In the last of these the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina declared invalid an act of the legislature on the definite
basis of its conflict with the written constitution. It may be of
significance that the attorneys who argued against the constitu-
tionality of the statute were William R. Davie, a delegate to the
Philadelphia Convention, and James Iredell, who later was ap-
pointed to the original bench of the Federal Supreme Court.' 6
Most of the attempts that have been made to prove that the
fathers of the Constitution had no inention of giving to the Fed-
eral courts the power to invalidate laws of Congress and the
State legislatures spring from a lack of knowledge of the basic
IQuincy Reports, 200; quoted by McLaughlin, The Courts, the
Constitution and Parties, p. 80.
21 Quincy (Mass.) 51 (1761); Corwin, The "Higher Law" Back-
ground of American Constitutional Law, (1928-29), 42 Harv. L. Rev.
149, 398.
1McLaughlin, The Foundation of American Constitutionalism,
p. 126.
'2Corwin, The Doctrine of Judicial Review, Princeton, 1914, p. 32.
"No report, save the pamphlet by Varnum (Providence, 1786),
who was counsel for the defense. The record is in 10 Records of the
State of Rhode Island (1865), 219.
"11 Bay 252 (1792).
1 N. C. 5 (1787).
"I1bid., p. 39.
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principles accepted by the leading members of the Federal Con-
vention. Virtually all of them subscribed to the natural rights
philosophy with its doctrine of law as a product of reason and
the natural order of things instead of will. They believed in a
written constitution as the embodiment of a law superior to
statutes, but also as a law enforceable by the courts, and bind-
ing upon all agencies of the government. Furthermore, one of
the principal reasons that had brought the Philadelphia Conven-
tion into existence was distrust of the recent activities of the
State legislatures. "To curtail legislative power as it existed
in the State constitutions in the interest, first, of an adequate
national power and, secondly, in the interest of private rights"
made logically necessary either a Congressional veto on State
laws or a judicial veto. When the former was rejected for rea-
sons of expediency, the latter was easily accepted as a funda-
mental feature of the new system.
17
Additional evidences can also be found, especially in the as-
sertions of particular members of the Convention which indi-
cate that they took judicial review for granted as an essential
part of the new government. Elbridge Gerry, for example, re-
ferred on June 4 to the fact that "In some States the judges
had already set aside laws, as being against the Constitution.' 8
On July 23 Madison declared that "A law violating a treaty
ratified by a pre-existing law, might be respected by the judges
as a law, though an unwise or perfidious one; a law violating a
constitution established by the people themselves, would be con-
sidered by the judges as null and void.'1 9  Madison made one
other assertion on the floor of the Convention which seemed to
imply that the Federal Courts would have the right to review
acts of Congress. On August 28 he declared that "retrospec-
tive interferences" with private rights would be prohibited by
the interdiction against ex post facto laws.2 0 As the ex post
facto clause which had been theretofore adopted by the Conven-
tion applied only to Congress, and not to the States, Madison's
I11bil., pp. 62-63. Interestingly enough Jefferson replied to Madi-
son's recommendation of a congressional negative on state laws by
suggesting that this function would be better taken care of by the
Federal judiciary upon appeal from the state courts. Letter to Madi-
son, June 20, 1787, Writings of Jefferson (Ford ed.), vol. IV, p. 391.
Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, vol. I, p. 97.
ibid., vol. II, p. 93.
Ibid., vol. II, p. 440.
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remark appears to have been a definite recognition of the power
of the judiciary to hold an act of the national legislature uncon-
stitutional and void.
21
During the period when the Constitution was before the
States for ratification, the idea that it provided for control of
legislation by the courts was scarcely ever questioned.22 Oppo-
nents of the new instrument criticized it, either because they
thought it would make the judiciary supreme over the represen-
tatives of the people, or because they feared that judicial en-
forcement of limitations upon Congress could never be an effec-
tive substitute for a bill of rights. In other words they took for
granted that judicial review had been provided for by the Con-
vention. Hamilton replied to these criticisms in Number 78 of
the Federalist; not, however, by denying that judicial review
was included in the Constitution, but by affirming it, and insist-
ing that it was necesary, to keep the legislature within the pre-
scribed limits of its authority and to protect individual rights.23
On the basis of these and other evidences many of the ablest
commentators on our constitutional history have concluded that
the members of the Federal Convention clearly intended that
judicial review in some degree should be included as a funda-
mental part of the new system of government; that it was the
natural outgrowth of ideas that had been commonly accepted
for many years prior to 1787, and of precedents entirely too
numerous and impressive to be ignored. This is the reasoned
judgment of Professors Corwin, McLaughlin, Farrand, Chan-
ning, and Charles Warren.
24
II
Madison's theory of the power of the courts, like most of
the rest of his political philosophy, was a product of influences
dominant at the time the Constitution was adopted, and it did
not differ materially from the views of most of his political as-
OCharles Warren, The Making of the Constitution, Boston, 1929,
p. 556, note.
2 Corwin, The Doctrine of Judicial Review, p. 17.
2 Lodge edition, p. 485.
11 Corwin, The Doctrine of Judicial Review, p. 10; McLaughlin,
The Courts, the Constitution and Parties, p. 76; Farrand, The Framing
of the Constitution of the United States, p. 157; Channing, A Histo:y
of the United States, vol. III, p. 498-502; Warren, The Supreme Court
In the United States History, vol. I, pp. 5-6.
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sociates of that day. Like them he conceived of all governmen-
tal authority as limited by a superior law, derived partly from
the order of nature, and partly from the ultimate sovereigns
who formed the political compact. He regarded the Constitu-
tion as an expression of that law; and he considered the courts
to be better qualified than any other branch of the government
to expound the Constitution, and therefore charged with the re-
sponsibility of maintaining it and protecting individuals under
the general body of abstract rights.
As long as he lived Madison did not modify his earlier
theories of judicial power very much. Despite significant
changes in constitutional theory and practice he never abandoned
his belief in the authority of the courts to pass upon the validity
of legislation, especially of the sort that affected private rights.
As a member of the First Congress he not only assumed the ex-
istence of such an authority, but warmly defended it. Having
introduced a set of amendments to constitute a bill of rights, he
declared that the courts would "consider themselves in a pecul-
iar manner the guardians of those rights; they would be an im-
penetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the
Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist
every encroachment upon rights stipulated for in the Constitu-
tion by the declaration of rights".25
When Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Marbury v.
Madison26 affirmed the power of the Supreme Court to declare
an act of Congress unconstitutional, Madison made no protest;
and neither for that matter did any of the other thirty-nine
members of the Philadelphia Convention who were living at that
time, with one or two exceptions.27 Madison censured the Court
rather severely, however, for its decision in the case of Mcul-
loch v. Maryland28 on the very interesting thesis that John
Marshall and his colleagues had abdicated their proper function
of controlling the legislative exercise of unconstitutional pow-
ers. He believed that the opinion in this case, with its broad
definition of the implied powers of Congress, would leave the
exercise of legislative authority in the future almost unchecked.
Annals of Congress, vol. I, p. 439.
2 1 Cranch (U. S.) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
2 Charles Warren, Congress, the Constitution, and the Supreme
Court, Boston, 1930, p. 127, note.
4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
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He contended that if any means is to be considered constitu-
tional simply because it is "expedient" or "conducive to" a
legitimate end, then it would have to be left to Congress to de-
termine every means that should be employed to carry into
effect a specified power. He thought that the Court could
hardly presume to pass upon questions of expediency. As a con-
sequence there would be practically no limits to legislative an-
thority, and the whole scheme of government would be
changed.
2
At first thought Madison may seem in these assertions to
have contradicted his earlier opinions in the attack on the United
States Bank. On that occasion he had declared that each de-
partment should have the right to mark out the limits of its own
powers; now he appeared to be contending that the Supreme
Court should determine the scope of legislative power. There
was no real contradiction, however. In the earlier instance he
had in mind, of course, the limits of each department's powers
in relation to the other departments, but now he was referring
to legislative usurpations of power which he held to have been
reserved by the States.
There is additional evidence that Madison regarded judicial
review as an appropriate device for preserving the balance
between the Federal and State authorities, as well as a safe-
guard for individual rights. He declared on one occasion that
"The Federal judiciary is the only defensive armour of the Fed-
eral government, or, rather, for the Constitution and laws of
the United States. Strip it of that armour, and the door is
wide open for nullification, anarchy, and convulsion. "30 In
other words the Supreme Court, through its power to veto un-
constitutional laws of both the national and State legislatures,
would uphold the original division of sovereignty made by the
Constitution. Re considered that it would be impossible to leave
this function to the individual States, lest the Constitution be
given a different meaning in each, and the principle of equality
of the States be destroyed, since some would claim a greater
measure of sovereignty than others.3 1  Moreover, he appeared
'9Letter to Spencer Roane, Sept. 2, 1819, Writings (Hunt. ed.),
vol. VIII, pp. 449-52.
' Letter to J. C. Cabell, April 1, 1833, Writings (Cong. ed.), vol.
IV, pp. 296-97.
"Letter to Spencer Roane, June 29, 1821, Writings (Hunt ed.),
vol. IX, p. 66.
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to believe, in the latter period of his life at least, that the na-
tional government was in greater need of protection against
a disturbance of the constitutional balance of power, than the
States. He maintained that this was particularly true inasmuch
as the officers of the former were elected directly or indirectly
by, and were responsible to, the States, while the officers of the
State governments were entirely independent, in their appoint-
ment and responsibility, of the government of the United
States.32 He assumed, however, that it would also be the func-
tion of the Court to protect the States against usurpations of
power by the national government.33
III
Nevertheless, in spite of his strong conviction of the value
of the Court's functions, Madison made several important qual-
ifications of his theory of judicial control. In the first place he
denied that the Supreme Court of the United States should have
an absolute authority to decide controversies between the central
government and the States over the respective spheres of each.
He argued that there might be cases of usurpations by the Fed-
eral government of which the judiciary would never take cog-
nizance; or that the forms of the Constitution, to which the
courts were supposed to adhere, might not prove effectual safe-
guards against transgressions of the rights of the States. Fur-
thermore, the Federal judiciary itself might exercise or sanction
dangerous powers in excess of constitutional grants. In all such
cases as these, he maintained, the people in the States, who are
the parties to the compact, must have the ultimate right to judge.
And this right must extend to violations by one delegated author-
ity as much as by another, by the judicial department as well as
by Congress or the President. Or as he himself expressed it in
the Report on the Virginia Resolutions:
"The States, then, being the parties to the constitutional com-
pact, and in their sovereign capacity, it follows of necessity that
there can be no tribunal above their authority to decide, in the last
resort, whether the compact made by them be violated; and conse-
quently, as the parties to it, they must themselves decide, in the last
resort, such questions as may be of sufficient magnitude to require
their interposition. '"m
"Letter to Edward Everett, Aug. 28, 1830, Writings (Hunt ed.),
vol. IX, p. 398.
"Letter to J. C. Cabell, Sept. 7, 1829, Writings (Hunt ed.),
pp. 347-55.
"Writings (Hunt ed.), vol. VI, p. 349.
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In other words, the people in the States, having been the
original authors of the division of sovereignty, must retain the
ultimate right, in extreme cases, to adjudge disputes pertaining
to that division. Th.is did not imply, however, the right of the
people in an individual State to nullify Federal laws, or to
secede from the Union. Only the States collectively, he main-
tained, could have any authority to construe the constitutional
compact.
In the second place, Madison qualified his theory of judicial
control by denying to the courts the final power to decide ques-
tions involving controversies between departments of the gov-
ernment. He insisted that inasmuch as the three great branches
of the government were coordinate, and equally bound to sup-
port the Constitution, "each must in the exercise of its func-
tions be guided by the text of the Constitution according to its
own interpretation of it; and that consequently in the event of
irreconcilable interpretations, the prevalence of one or the other
department must depend on the nature of the case, as receiving
its final decision from the one or the other, and passing from
that decision into effect, without involving the functions of any
other." 35 What he evidently had in mind was that each depart-
ment should have the final authority to decide questions relating
to the exercise of powers within its own sphere of action. The
Supreme Court, that is, should have no authority to question
the judgment of Congress concerning what would be a valid ex-
ercise of legislative power; or of the President concerning an
exercise of executive power. The opposite hypothesis, he main-
tained, would establish a judicial oligarchy, and destroy the
principle of the separation of powers.36
Madison also modified the doctrine of judicial control by
insisting upon the rights of Congress to interpret the Constitu-
tion. He did not regard this as the exclusive prerogative of the
judiciary, although he admitted that in the ordinary course of
things it would appertain to that branch. He insisted, never-
theless, that it was not the intention of the authors of the fund-
amental law to give the judges a monopoly of that power, par-
ticularly in cases involving disagreements among the three de-
partments regarding the scope of their authority. But his con-
M Manuscript, Madison Papers, Library of Congress.
"Annals of Congress, vol. I, p. 501.
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ception of the power of Congress to engage in exposition of the
Constitution did not end here. He maintained that the national
legislature had at least a limited power to decide questions of
constitutionality that had been left in doubt by the written
organic law. To be sure no one Congress would have the Tight
to settle the issue; but over a considerable time the deliberate
and reiterated assertions of a particular constitutional construc-
tion, by a succession of Congresses, should be taken to possess
a de facto validity, and should therefore be entitled to the re-
spect of all branches of the government.37 In other words he
believed in a kind of rule of stare decisis for legislative as well
as judicial interpretation of the Constitution. He appeared to
think a course of such legislative expositions, sufficiently delib-
erate, uniform, and definite, would really be an expression of
the sovereign public will, almost tantamount to a constitutional
amendment.38 It was partly on this basis that he considered
the question of the constitutionality of the United States Bank
to have been finally settled,3 9 and he regarded legislative con-
struction of the Constitution as an important factor in favor of
the legality of protective tariffs. 40 After he had retired from
public life, he even suggested that it might be used to sanction
Federal expenditures for public improvements. 41 He maintained,
however, that a careful distinction should be drawn between
cases where Congress opposes the will of its constituents, as hap-
pened in the enactment of the Alien and Sedition laws, and cases
where the legislative will is in harmony with the will of a major-
ity of the people and the States. Only in cases of the latter
sort, would Congressional exposition of the Constitution have
any validity.
42
Finally, in the Federal Convention Madison had even been
opposed to giving the Supreme Court a general jdrisdiction over
17Letter to C. J. Ingersoll, June 25, 1831, Writings (Cong. ed.),
vol. IV, pp. 185-186.
38Letter to C. E. Haynes, Feb. 25, 1831, Writings (Hunt ed.), vol.
IX, p. 443.
'aLetter to C. E. Haynes, Feb. 25, 1831, Writings (Hunt ed.), vol.
IX, p. 443.
4°Letter to Professor Davis, 1832, Writings (Cong. ed.), vol. IX,
p. 246.
4'Letter to Jefferson, Feb. 17, 1825, Writings (Cong. ed.), voL III,
p. 483.
0 Letter to N. P. Trist, Feb. 7, 1827, Writings (Cong. ed.), vol. III,
p. 551.
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cases arising under the Constitution.43 He also condemned a
general power of judicial review in his remarks on Jefferson's
Draught of a Constitution for Virginia. 44 It would appear jus-
tifiable to say then that the main objectives of Madison's con-
ception of judicial review were limited to the protection of pri-
vate rights against impulsive legislatures and the settlement of
ordinary conflicts between Federal and State authorities. But
it can hardly be assumed that this would place many stumbling
blocks in the path of the courts.
In conclusion, then, the practical effect of Madison's theory
of judicial review would probably not differ much from that of
the doctrine which prevails today. His devotion to the princi-
ple of the separation of powers led him to oppose judicial su-
premacy, but his theory of the Constitution as a higher law
made acceptance of control by the judicial branch logically in-
evitable. Moreover, his belief in the sanctity of private rights,
including the right of property, compelled him to look with
favor upon a veto of legislation by the courts as a necessary
means of protecting minorities, although, it must be conceded
that his conception of property was somewhat more restricted
than that which the courts now apply. He always conceived of
property as real wealth as opposed to the "paper wealth"
created by stock-jobbing capitalists. Finally, he regarded the
whole body of individual rights, whether mentioned in the Con-
stitution or not, as a limitation, which the courts should enforce,
upon the powers of government. This was the same view which
had been expressed by Hamilton in Federalist 78, and it formed
an essential basis of Chief Justice Hughes' recent decision in the
case of Perry v. United States.45
Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, vol. II, p. 430.
"Writings (Cong. ed.), vol. I, p. 194.
294 U. S. 330, 55 Sup. Ct. 432, 79 L. Ed. 912 (1935).
